Migration, Policy, and Formation of Cities by Laurila, Hannu
  
 
 
 
T A M P E R E  E C O N O M I C  W O R K I N G  P A P E R S  
N E T  S E R I E S  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MIGRATION, POLICY, AND FORMATION OF CITIES 
 
 
Hannu Laurila 
 
 
Working Paper 28 
December 2003 
http://tampub.uta.fi/econet/wp28-2003.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
FIN-33014 UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE, FINLAND 
 
 
ISSN 1458-1191 
ISBN 951-44-5874-5 
MIGRATION, POLICY, AND FORMATION OF CITIES  
5.5.2004 
 
 
Hannu Laurila 
Department of Economics 
FI-33014 University of Tampere 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Efficient allocation of resources is the cornerstone of market economy, and migration 
of people is an elementary part of the allocation mechanism. This paper presents a 
simple club theoretic model of migration between cities. In the model, welfare in a 
city depends on its size, and people migrate between cities in seek for welfare gains. 
Migration alone can produce stable and efficient market solutions only under very 
special circumstances. In general, the mechanism must be supplemented by collective 
optimization of population by local policy. In the most realistic case of heterogeneous 
cities centralized policy interventions are necessary to secure efficiency. The results 
about the effects of centralized policy somewhat contradict the conventional wisdom. 
First, administrative and economic policy measures (quantity restrictions and lump 
sum transfers, respectively) differ in their effects, and second, lump sum transfers 
actually motor up rather than stabilize spatial evolution. 
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1 Introduction 
Efficient allocation of resources is the cornerstone of market economy. The abstract 
concept of resource allocation becomes more concrete once one accepts the fact that 
economic resources are always spatially attached to people, firms and all kinds of 
physical and social structures. Therefore, any reallocation of resources inevitably 
implies physical relocation in geographical space. The national geography in turn is 
composed of a set of different kinds of agglomerations of people and economic 
functions.  
 
Location decisions of firms and people constitute the basic mechanism that forms the 
spatial economy and the cities. Location in general and urban location in particular is 
a central determinant of firms’ profits and people’s welfare. On one hand, this is 
because of the simple fact that the everyday transactions in the factor and goods 
markets take space and necessitate transit. Therefore, proximity of economic and 
other functions affects the transaction costs. On the other hand, there are economics of 
scale and scope, economies of localization and urbanization, and other externalities 
that have direct and indirect effects on profits and welfare. The economies of 
agglomeration have grown more and more important, and urban areas and cities 
indisputably offer the most fertile soil for the flourishing of the modern market 
economy. 
 
This paper examines the working of the market mechanism in producing an efficient 
system of cities. Being aware of the well-known weaknesses of standard-type 
competitive models in the spatial context, a simple club theoretic model is constructed 
to provide a general equilibrium treatment of spatial evolution of the economy. To 
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grasp the essentials about the simultaneous nature of the development, the location 
decisions of firms are taken to be subordinate to people’s choices in that the firms are 
assumed to relocate instantly according to any changes in commodity and factor 
markets so that they are always in their profit maximizing location. Focusing on 
migration of people enables a simple translation of efficiency into terms of social 
welfare. This translation reflects the main feature of the market economy that the 
production factors, solely owned by the people, must be made efficiently use of so as 
to maximise people’s utility from consumption of the final goods.  
 
The present model is based on two main components. First, the size of a city - or 
proximity of people and various economic and non-economic functions - matters to 
the welfare it can create to its residents. Welfare in a city is a product of private and 
collective consumption and production activities. Most of these activities are local in 
nature and take place in local goods and factor markets. Due to externalities and 
economies of scale in production and consumption, the size of the local marketplace 
is relevant as to the attainable local welfare. As welfare depends on economic and 
non-economic locality-dependent characters, an increase of the size of a city yields 
benefits and cost savings, but eventually it may bring up also falling benefits and 
increasing costs. The collective nature of cities arises from the agglomeration 
economies attached with production and consumption of private goods, and from 
indivisibility of local public goods and services. Without these characteristics, a 
totally dispersed spatial pattern would sustain.  
 
Second, in a decentralized market economy with autonomous local governments, 
people exert their utility maximising choices in two ways, in a purely private fashion 
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through migration, and in a collective fashion through local democracy. By migration 
people seek for optimal location in order to maximise welfare. The choices are made 
against private calculations of welfare in different locations. Individual agents take the 
local circumstances as parametric, but do not take into account the external effects 
they cause to other individual agents. Free mobility of people based on perfect 
information about the benefits and cost attached to different cities creates a basic 
market mechanism in the spatial system.  
 
The major flaw of free mobility as a market mechanism is that peoples’ location 
decisions are not continuous in nature. This non-convexity problem is to say that 
people cannot choose optimal amounts, that is city size, like they do in conventional 
marketplaces. But, since the pooling up of the positive and negative effects of 
agglomeration depends on city size, size must be an endogenous choice variable in the 
model. The collective type of decision-making solves the problem: people exert their 
choice on city size as a collective, through local democracy. Autonomous local 
governments must thus as active market agents optimise on the size of the city. Free 
mobility and collective optimization of city size can together provide an efficient 
market mechanism, at least if there are no externalities or spillovers that work 
between the cities. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 starts with a textbook case of migration 
between big and homogenous cities and illustrates the welfare effects of collective 
optimization on population. Chapter 3 examines the reverse case of small cities. 
Chapter 4 introduces the complications caused by various kinds of asymmetries in the 
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set-up, and investigates the need, instruments and effects of centralized policy. 
Chapter 5 concludes the findings.  
 
2 Big homogenous cities 
2.1 Migration 
The standard textbook case concerns an economy that consists of a multiple of big 
homogenous cities. Assume that there is no rural sector in the economy, and that there 
is no geographic, climatic or other variation in the national territory such that would 
affect the welfare creating potentials of the cities. Assume also identical technology 
and technical efficiency in the local private and public sectors in all cities, and that the 
geographical areas of the cities correspond to their long-term optima.  
 
The first step is to examine the pure market solution of spatial allocation of population 
in the economy. The market mechanism is based on perfect mobility of utility 
maximizing people. People make the most preferred choices among the alternatives. 
Call this kind of a choice the exit decision (Bailey, 1999). For simplicity, fix the total 
population in the economy to n and the number of cities to m. This is to say that the 
total population must always be allocated into the existing cities.  
 
Welfare in a city is taken to depend on its size because of agglomeration economies 
(Richardson, 1973). The relevant measure for welfare is that experienced by 
individual migrants. In the presence of agglomeration economies and eventual 
agglomeration diseconomies, the welfare that a city can offer to its residents can be 
presented by an inverted U-shaped average welfare curve. It must be noted, though, 
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that the full shape of the curve is unobservable to the people – the only operational 
observation is the value of average welfare that occurs at a certain point on the curve. 
Moreover, the average welfare curve is accompanied by a marginal welfare curve, 
which remains totally abstract to the people. Figure 1 presents these kinds of 
schedules in a pair-wise setting for two optional cities superimposed on each other.  
 
(Figure 1 here) 
 
In Figure 1, there are two optional sites of residence, one particular city A and city B, 
which represents the rest of the economy. The average welfare curve for city A, 
denoted by WA, is drawn from left to right. The marginal welfare curve MWA strikes 
through WA from above at its culmination point. The respective curves for city B, 
denoted by WB and MWB, are drawn from right to left. The latter schedules represent 
all the remaining m-1 identical cities in terms of one such city. Denote the length of 
the horizontal axis by N. A simpler way to deal with the setting would be to assume 
the economy to consist of only two cities and let N = n. This interpretation would 
suffice in the present simple case. In any case, since all cities are alike, the two sets of 
curves are identical mirror images.  
 
By strict interpretation, the use of average welfare schedules as the relevant 
information for individual people suggests that people should (ex ante) be assumed 
homogeneous. A less strict interpretation is that the schedules reflect (ex post) 
average or systematic responses of people. Some people may migrate against the main 
stream, but that kind of behaviour can be (ex post) regarded as purely stochastic. The 
latter interpretation is particularly tempting in the present setting, where migrants 
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choose between homogenous alternatives, and where the systematic direction of 
migration is what matters.  
 
To investigate the mechanism of free migration driven by individual welfare 
maximisation, suppose that there initially exists an observed welfare differential 
between the cities. If the initial allocation of people is described, say, by n1, there is a 
welfare differential that amounts to WAc - WBd > 0. The attainable welfare gain attracts 
individual people to city A, which makes n shift rightwards in Figure 1. As a 
consequence, average welfare in city A falls because of increased agglomeration 
diseconomies, and average welfare in city B rises because of decreased agglomeration 
diseconomies. Migration towards city A will continue as long as it is regarded 
beneficial, that is until the average welfare in both cities becomes equalized. The 
market equilibrium occurs at the intersection point e, where  
 
WAe = WBe.           (1) 
 
The solution is stable since nobody can gain by moving into another city. As a result, 
ne people will reside in city A and (N - ne) people will reside in city B. In the present 
case of homogenous cities the optimal population equals in every city, that is  
 
ne = (N - ne) = n/m.         (2) 
 
Efficiency of the market solution can be evaluated in terms of social welfare. The 
basic measure of social welfare is given by the sum of the areas below the marginal 
welfare curves. Because of perfect homogeneity of the cities, the marginal welfare 
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curves MWA and MWB intersect in point E, which lays vertically below the 
equilibrium point e at ne. Social welfare in this market solution is given by the sum of 
the areas OAaEne and neEbOB in Figure 1. Compare the sum to that in the initial 
allocation of population n1 (or any allocation other than ne) and find that the market 
solution is superior. Alternatively, social welfare can be measured by the sum of the 
areas ne times WAe, and (N - ne) times WBe. To include also the welfares of those 
people in the remaining m-2 cities that are not present in the figure, the respective 
welfare areas have to be accounted for. In this simple case social welfare, denoted by 
SW, thus reads SWe = neWAe+(n - ne)WBe, which, using (1) and (2), yields 
 
SWe = nWie = mneWie, i=A,B.        (3) 
 
The conclusion is that the market solution is efficient because social welfare is 
maximised. Therefore, in this special case, individual maximisation of personal 
welfare ends up to a social optimum that gives the maximal social welfare attainable 
for all the n people in the m localities. 
 
2.2 Policy considerations 
The second step is to take into account that people exert their choices not only 
through migration (exit) between the cities but also collectively within the cities. The 
concept voice refers to the collective mode of people’s decision-making (Bailey, 
1999). This is to say that the collective power of the cities joins the purely 
individualistic power of migration in the mechanism that determines the formation of 
cities in the economy. The non-convexity problem of exit (Stiglitz, 1977, p. 275) is 
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overcome. Assume that the collective preference revealing mechanism within the 
cities is efficient.  
 
In optimization of their population, the cities can take a total economy approach and 
aim to maximisation of the total welfare in the city, or they can take the within-club 
approach and aim to maximisation of the average welfare in the city (Cornes & 
Sandler, 1986, p. 175-176). Note that the term ‘total economy’ is somewhat confusing 
here because it refers to a single city, not to the whole economy consisting of multiple 
cities. By Figure 1, however, it is evident that the city-wise total economy approach is 
useless. The population distribution given by n1 actually is such that maximizes total 
welfare in city B. This is because the MWB curve strikes through the horizontal axis at 
n1. But, as it was seen above, the situation is not sustainable, because people are 
motivated to emigrate from city B to city A. Local policy based on the total economy 
type policy rule is thus nullified by free migration.  
 
The policy rule of the within-club approach, on the other hand, is sustainable. By 
setting its population so as to maximize its average welfare and by closing doors 
before additional immigrants, a city can shelter itself from the negative effects of 
migration. Implementation of this kind of a policy may, however, be difficult unless 
the initial starting point of migration is on the rising part of the W curve in the 
considered city. If so, the policy is operational. A situation depicted in Figure 1 is 
more academic in nature, because implementation of the policy in that case would 
necessitate eviction of excess people, which sounds incompatible with the concept of 
free market economy. Anyway, provided that the policy is fully operational, the 
outcome is stable since nobody can migrate after the implementation of the policy. 
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The outcome is not efficient in this partial equilibrium setting, however, because 
social welfare inevitably remains lower than that in the market equilibrium.  
 
Examination of efficiency of collective action from the long-term general equilibrium 
point of view necessitates some amendments to the assumptions. If all cities apply the 
within-club type policy rule and constrain their size according to the culmination 
point of their average welfare curve, the inevitable result is that the sizes of the 
existing cities fall and, consequently, all the n people cannot fit into the m cities. 
Therefore, social welfare would fall. This problem can be overcome by letting the 
number of localities m to be variable. In the longer term, new cities may enter into the 
city system, which is to say that the number of cities becomes an endogenous variable 
in the model. 
 
Assume that m is variable and let the cities optimize on their population and limit 
their size to the average welfare maximising level. Assume also that the general 
conditions concerning technology, tastes etc. remain unchanged during the adjustment 
period. Those people who are excluded from the set of optimal cities must found new 
growing agglomerations, which eventually reach their optimal size, and so on. The 
number of cities increases until a general equilibrium is reached. Figure 2 illustrates 
the outcome. 
 
(Figure 2 here) 
 
Figure 2 shows that, since the length of the horizontal axis in the two-city presentation 
is, by expression (2), N = n2/m, an increase in m will inevitably make the vertical axis 
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shorter for the two particular cities. This in turn brings the two sets of curves closer to 
each other. Exclusion of people from the initial cities and founding of new 
homogenous cities will continue until the maximum points of the average welfare 
curves coincide in the pair-wise setting of Figure 2. At the equilibrium point e* also 
the marginal welfare schedules intersect. Ignore the integer problem and assume that 
all people are included in the resulting m* optimal cities so that  
 
m*ne* = n.           (2’) 
 
The result is that the welfare of all residents in all cities is maximized and equal. 
Moreover, in terms of the long-term equilibrium of Figure 2, WA = MWA = WB = 
MWB.  
 
In the general equilibrium of Figure 2, total population is allocated into a set of cities 
that all maximise the welfare of their residents. Then also the social welfare in the 
economy is maximised. Social welfare can be measured by the sum of the areas below 
the intersecting MW curves, or by the sum of the products of population and average 
welfare at ne* (including the remaining m*-2 cities in both versions). More formally, 
recalling expression (2’), 
 
SW* =  m* ne*Wi* = nWi*, i=A,B.        (3’) 
 
Any other population allocation than ne* would yield lower social welfare. 
Furthermore, comparison of expressions (3) and (3’) shows that the long-term 
solution is Pareto superior to the previous case of migration between a fixed number 
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of localities, that is SW* > SWe. This is because Wi* > Wie, that is all people are now 
better off since they are getting the maximal attainable welfare in the more numerous 
cities in which the higher welfare is experienced. Being at the top of the average 
welfare curves in each city is to say that agglomeration economies are optimally 
utilised with reference to agglomeration diseconomies. The solution corresponds to 
the long-term equilibrium of the competitive commodity markets, where goods are 
produced and consumed at minimum average cost.  
 
The last modification to the analysis is to consider the total population n also as a 
variable. This is to say that people are free to migrate not only inside the economy but 
also between economies. Assumption of perfect inter-economy mobility of people, 
however, does not change the above result. As a matter of fact, it merely makes the 
evolution of the system of cities towards the equilibrium more credible and gives 
more reason to ignore the integer problem. This is because N = 2n/m says that 
changes in m and n affect the length of the horizontal axis of Figure 2 in opposite 
directions.  
 
If both m and n are variable, it is obvious that n can either increase or decrease. On 
one hand, exclusion of people outside the optimized cities can result in an outflow 
from the system, and make n decrease while m increases. The path to the equilibrium 
e* becomes more straightforward. The long-term equilibrium is in principle reachable 
even among the initial set of m cities with a smaller number of total population. The 
dismal character of this result is that social welfare falls as compared to (3’) and 
maybe also to (3) because there are less people to experience Wi* in fewer cities of 
optimal size. On the other hand, the growth of new cities may attract people from 
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outside the system, which makes n to increase along with m. The equilibrium path 
becomes more winding, and the natural limits of the national territory will be the final 
constraint to the development. The increase in n will also increase social welfare as 
compared to (3), at least if the newcomers’ welfare is treated equally to the original 
people’s welfare.   
 
To sum up, the standard case of big homogenous cities yields a comforting result: 
efficiency is guaranteed with or without collective decision-making in the cities. Free 
migration alone (exit) ends up to a stable and efficient outcome, but in the longer run 
free migration and collective decision-making (exit and voice) together can produce a 
Pareto superior outcome. This precludes endogenous determination of the number of 
cities m in the system. In either case, there is no need for a policy intervention from 
the viewpoint of the social welfare of the whole economy. In general, this 
modification complicates the evaluation of social welfare somewhat because the sign 
of the change in total population n remains ambiguous. Taking total population as 
endogenous may give reason to centralized policy intervention to stop emigration 
from the economy.  
 
3 Small cities 
3.1 Migration 
The setting in the above chapter was constructed under the presumption that the cities 
are initially big so that the market solutions appear on the falling regimes of the 
average and marginal welfare schedules. Migration flows that direct from bigger 
towards less big cities make agglomeration diseconomies in the whole system 
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diminish. However, this kind of a situation can be regarded only as a special case, and 
an obvious extension would be to analyse the opposite case, where the cities are small 
so that agglomeration economies dominate everywhere. Therefore, turn now to the 
case of initially small homogenous cities, illustrated by Figure 3. 
 
(Figure 3 here) 
 
Figure 3 again presents two cities, one particular city A and city B as a representative 
of the rest of the economy. To examine the existence of a market solution of free 
migration, consider point e, where the average welfare in both cities is equal, WAe = 
WBe. In this equi-welfare position, there are no systematic gains to be achieved by 
moving. Nevertheless, somebody is always on the move for purely stochastic reasons. 
Suppose that there occurs a stochastic migration shock from city B to city A so that 
the population of city A is drawn to n’. As a result, a welfare gap WA’ - WB’ > 0 is 
opened up. The welfare gap now starts to attract systematic migration to city A. This, 
in turn, makes the welfare gap even wider, and accelerates migration further. Point e 
is clearly not a stable solution. As a matter of fact, free migration would continue until 
city B becomes totally deserted. If the stochastic element of migration should have 
emerged towards B, then A would have been deserted. The two stable market 
equilibriums on the left or right vertical axis are corner solutions in nature.  
 
The evaluation of efficiency is a bit more complicated in the case of small cities than 
in the case of big ones. As the setting is drawn in Figure 1, the non-stable solution e 
seems to be efficient at the marginal. Because of the assumption of homogenous 
cities, the MW curves intersect at E vertically above e, irrespective to whether the two 
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MW curves rise or fall around point E. Comparing the social welfare at ne to that at n’, 
the conclusion is that the stochastic deviation from ne causes a welfare loss depicted 
by the area Eab. If the corner solutions are efficient or not as compared to point e, 
however, depends on the curvatures of the W and MW schedules nearby the vertical 
axis. In particular, if the W curves hit the vertical axis above/below WAe = WBe, then 
the corner solution is Pareto superior/inferior to that at point e. If the latter should be 
the case, then there clearly is need for some kind of a policy intervention to prevent 
deviations from point e type non-stable but at the marginal efficient solutions. 
(Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1982, p. 533-535.)   
 
3.2 Policy considerations 
Figure 3 reveals the possible need for policy intervention. The next step of the 
analysis then is to ask if the intervention should be local or central in nature. Start by 
investigating the effects of local policy. Assume again that the cities apply the within-
club type optimization on their population, and let m and n be variable. For the 
fortunate city A in Figure 3 local policy-making implies that the welfare increasing 
immigration is stopped in the culmination point of WA, which is to say that nA is 
chosen. In this case the policy is easy to implement – it suffices to close doors at the 
optimum. The policy instruments include city planning, dimensioning of local public 
services etc. While city A is stabilized at its optimal position, migration continues 
between the remaining cities. Some of the fortunate cities are eventually able to reach 
their optimum and close doors, but some less fortunate cities continue to loose 
population. The result is a set of optimal cities and a set of deserted ones. In the path 
towards a general equilibrium solution, the number of cities m must fall. On the other 
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hand, the number of total population n may change in any direction. Figure 4 presents 
the longer-term evolution. 
 
(Figure 4 here) 
 
Recalling again that the length of the horizontal axis in Figure 4 is given by N = n2/m, 
a fall in m and/or an increase in n is to say that the axis becomes longer. Since the W 
and MW schedules for the two cities A and B stick to the respective vertical axis, the 
schedule sets are drawn closer to each other in the figure. In the long-term optimum 
the culmination points of the W schedules coincide in e*, where the MW schedules 
also intersect. The result is a stable and Pareto efficient equilibrium, where nobody 
can gain by moving to another city. Average welfare W* is equalised in all existing 
m* cities of n* population. Social welfare is measured by  
 
SW* = n*m* Wi*, i=A=B.                   (3”) 
 
The solution is Pareto superior to the initial e type solution and to the two possible 
corner solutions provided that total population does not decrease. Optimality of course 
necessitates that the integer problem is avoided. The possible increase in n again helps 
in this respect and facilitates a solution that is superior to (3”) also for the whole set of 
initial cities m. In general it cannot be ruled out that the total population might also 
decrease. If people move outside the system rather than between the domestic cities, 
the evolution towards the equilibrium will take time and social welfare will erode as 
compared to (3”). 
 
 16 
To sum up, the market mechanism based on exit and voice type decision-making is in 
principle able to provide an efficient solution in the case of small cities. Centralized 
policy intervention is not needed unless people choose to emigrate out of the economy 
rather than to move inside the economy. 
 
4 Asymmetric settings  
4.1 Migration 
An elementary assumption in the above two applications of the model is that the cities 
are not only big or small at the same time but also homogenous in their capability to 
create welfare for their residents. The assumption simplifies the set-up and is general 
enough to grasp the essential elements behind the evolution of the city system. In 
practice, however, this kind of an assumption is seldom satisfied. Both components of 
the assumption need to be critically assessed. 
 
In practice, any system of cities usually consists of a few big cities and a lot of smaller 
ones. The famous Zipf’s law is astonishingly valid throughout the world, at least in 
the long run. The simple rank size rule version of the law says that the size of the 
second biggest city is half that of the biggest one, the size of the third biggest city is 
one-third that of the biggest and so on (McCann, 2001, p. 79-80). Quite evidently, 
notable migration flows occur between cities of different size. Migration flows can 
also occur between cities in different position as to utilization of agglomeration 
economies. In the rank order of the cities, the largest cities (and often the most 
attracting ones) may encounter dominance of agglomeration diseconomies, while the 
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smaller ones are at the same time in the regime of dominating agglomeration 
economies.  
 
Second, there are good reasons to believe that the cities are heterogeneous in their 
capability to create welfare. This is due to variation in geography and climate, 
immobility of natural resources, fixed national infrastructure and networks, transport 
and trade connections, industrial structure, administrative status etc. Heterogeneity of 
the cities results in differences in the respective sets of the W and MW schedules. One 
gets an immediate insight into the role of the assumption by closer inspection of 
Figure 1: if the sets of the W and MW schedules are not perfect mirror images, the 
intersection points e and E do not necessarily lay vertically one upon another. This is 
to say that the stable solution of free migration is not necessarily efficient even in the 
short-term case of big cities.  
 
It seems more than appropriate to consider the complications caused by various kinds 
of asymmetries in the above model of inter-city migration. For simplicity, consider 
two types of cities, type A and type B, of which the A type cities have an absolute 
advantage in generating welfare. This is to say that the average welfare curve reaches 
a higher peak value in city A than in city B. Figure 5 below is drawn to illustrate not 
only all kinds of possible settings between different types of cities but also the 
possible long-term equilibrium given that m and n may be variable.    
 
(Figure 5 here) 
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In figure 5, the W and MW curves are again presented from left to right for a city of 
type A and from right to left for a city of type B. The W curves are drawn to intersect 
in two points, a and b, which suffices to illustrate all kinds of pair-wise situations 
between cities A and B.  
 
Start by analyzing the situation around point a, where the small but prosperous city A 
benefits from agglomeration economies, while the much bigger but less prosperous 
city B suffers from excess agglomeration diseconomies. In the intersection point a 
welfare in both cities would be equal. The point a is not, however, a stable market 
solution of free migration. To the left from point a, a welfare gap is opened in favour 
of city B, and migration from A to B draws the solution further to the left. Rightwards 
from point a, a welfare gap is opened in favour of city A, and migration draws further 
to the right.  
 
Around the intersection point b, on the other end, the more modern but overly 
congested city A meets competition of migrants with a traditionally equipped small 
city B. Now the welfare equalizing solution at point b is stable. On the left side of 
point b city A attracts immigrants from city B drawing the solution rightwards. The 
opposite is true on the right side of point b. Thus, point b is a stable market 
equilibrium brought up by migration 
 
Neither of the welfare equalizing points a and b in Figure 5 is socially optimal. It is 
easy to see that even the stable solution at point b is not efficient – any other 
allocation of population leftwards from nb would clearly imply higher social welfare. 
The higher welfare potentials of the cities remain unutilized because people are only 
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capable to see the existing welfare differentials. The socially optimal solution occurs 
in point E at nE, where the corresponding MW curves intersect reflecting optimal 
utilisation of agglomeration economies in the city system. Therefore, for example in 
the stable equilibrium point b city A is overly crowded and city B is under-populated 
as compared to optimal utilization of agglomeration economies in the economy.  
 
4.2 Policy considerations 
At the socially efficient allocation of population nE, however, there is a welfare 
differential WAE - WBE > 0 in favour of city A. Thus it seems that a socially optimal 
allocation of people between city A and city B can be achieved only by a policy 
intervention that sustains the welfare gap. This seems to be necessary even if local 
within-club optimization of population is assumed. If both cities A and B optimize 
their population according to the within-club rule and m and n settle to their optimal 
values and no integer problem exists, the outcome is that depicted by n* in Figure 5.  
At this long-term optimum allocation n*, there is a welfare gap WA*- WB* > 0 in 
favour of city A, but the solution still deviates from the socially optimal nE, where the 
gap is WAE - WBE > 0. More precisely, the result of local level policy-making reads for 
the representative pair of cities 
 
SW* = n* WA* + (N-n*)WB* < nEWAE + (N-nE)WBE = SWE.    (4) 
 
By expression (4) it is obvious that reaching to the social optimum necessitates a 
centralized total economy approach that includes both cities A and B. The central 
government has the two standard options for policy instruments, the administrative 
instruments and the economic instruments. The administrative instruments input the 
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policy impulse along the horizontal axis in Figure 5, and the economic instruments 
input the impulse along the vertical axis in Figure 5. The conventional wisdom 
concerning the centralised policy intervention is that the measures should be 
horizontally and vertically equal in their effect, or to put it more precisely, both 
instruments should stabilize the status quo of the spatial structure. 
 
The administrative policy instruments include quantity rationing that is legislative and 
other such policy measures that produce the optimal allocation nE and make it 
sustainable. In this kind of a planning solution there exist welfare differences between 
the two types of localities. The economy is divided into better-off and worse-off 
cities, which is to say that the principle of regional equity must be ignored. 
Implementation of the policy means that people are allowed to move from city B to 
city A until the allocation nE is reached. The policy is feasible if the instruments of 
optimization of population are in the hands of the central, not local level. 
Nevertheless, social welfare in the whole economy is maximal, 
 
SWE = nEWAE + (N-nE)WBE.        (4’) 
 
If regional equity is to be respected, the economic instrument can be used. The central 
government can use in-cash transfers to level up the welfare differences and thus 
make he solution stable and sustainable. Assume that the transfers are made 
effectively in a lump sum manner so as to transfer resources and therefore welfare 
from the richer cities to the poorer ones. This is reflected by a downward shift of the 
WA and MWA curves and an upward shift of the WB and MWB curves in Figure 5. 
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Figure 6 illustrates the effects of lump sum transfers from A-type cities to B-type 
cities. 
 
(Figure 6 here)  
 
The first and somewhat surprising message of Figure 6 is that the efficient allocation 
nE obviously cannot be the target of the transfer policy. This is because the use of a 
transfer changes the optimality condition. A lump sum transfer from city A to city B 
leaves the shapes of the W and MW curves unchanged but shifts the WA and MWA 
curves vertically downwards and the WB and MWB curves upwards. As a result the 
optimality condition given by the intersection point E shifts to the left from nE. An 
optimal transfer is such that draws the two sets of curves to intersect in point E* at the 
allocation n*, which is the same long-term allocation that is produced by local policy-
making. The key difference is that, due to the lump-sum transfer, both the W and MW 
curves now intersect at the same population allocation. The solution is both welfare 
equalizing and efficient. More formally 
 
SWE* = n* WAE* + (N-n*)WBE* = SWE.                (4”) 
 
Recalling expression (4), it can be concluded that centralized policy intervention by 
administrative or economic measures not only secures a Pareto efficient outcome, but 
it also provides a Pareto superior outcome to that yielded by local level policy-
making. In terms of total welfare, the effects of the administrative policy measure of 
quantity rationing and the economic measure of lump sum transfers are equal. In 
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terms of personal welfare and, consequently, in terms of allocation of population, 
however, the effects are different.  
 
The above finding is very interesting because it contradicts the conventional wisdom 
of equal effects of the administrative and economic measures. In particular, the result 
implies that effective transfer policy necessitates variability of the number of cities, 
precluded that the allocation deviates from the long-term solution n* yielded by local 
optimization of population. The latter aspect contradicts the conventional view that 
inter-regional transfers should, by leveling up the welfare differentials, preserve the 
status quo of the spatial economy, and thus hinder regional evolution rather than 
motor it up. 
 
4.3 Further elaboration 
The above finding is alarming as to the working of the market mechanism in the 
spatial context: neither free migration (exit) nor local optimisation of population 
(voice) seems to secure efficient allocation of population in the economy. Even the 
long-term result of local policy-making must be altered by centralized transfer policy. 
The situation is not so bad, however. The result is due to the assumption of 
heterogeneous cities but more or less homogeneous people. Elaboration of these 
assumptions gives further support to the working of the spatial market mechanism, at 
least in principle. 
 
As to the assumption of heterogeneous cities, it might be argued that, in the longer run 
the initial circumstances in the cities would change and the cities would converge and 
become more and more homogenous. The possible solutions would then also 
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converge to those presented in Figures 2 and 4. The empirical evidence provided by 
e.g. the tests of the above mentioned Zipf’s law, however, suggests that the basic 
geographic, climatic etc. differences are quite persistent and hard to overcome, and 
that the convergence is at the best due to remain partial.  
 
Relaxing the assumption about homogeneity of people and letting them be explicitly 
heterogeneous in their experiences of welfare yields a more powerful explanation for 
the existence of market mechanism. The famous Tiebout (1956) hypothesis says that 
if people are heterogeneous and free to migrate, they can form an effective set of 
cities, homogenous inside but heterogeneous from each other. As the size of each 
such city is optimized by maximization of average welfare, social welfare in the 
economy is maximal. The solution is solely based on the exit and voice type decisions 
of people, and the role of the central government is totally omitted unless inter-city 
externalities are allowed to exist.  
 
The Tiebout hypothesis yields a convenient analogy between the Tiebout framework 
and the familiar competitive market model. Such an analogy is crucial if one wants to 
translate the message of the abstract competitive models into the language of the real 
world operating in the spatial context. Due to the extreme importance of the issue, the 
variants of the Tiebout model are numerous. The existence and efficiency of the 
Tiebout equilibrium, however, rest on a quite restrictive set of assumptions. From the 
club theoretic viewpoint the basic preconditions are that the total population is large 
enough, and that the national territory can support the large number of optimal cities 
so that all kinds of preferences can be satisfied at the maximum of personal welfare 
without any integer problems.  
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 The validity of the Tiebout hypothesis in describing the competitive market analogy 
in the form of an efficient equilibrium distribution of households among jurisdictions 
(or cities as they are called here) is vividly discussed in the literature. The treatments 
in the literature are usually more partial that that in this paper, but the main conclusion 
is that the validity has remained somewhat unresolved both theoretically and 
empirically. (Stiglitz, 1977; Topham, 1983; Rubinfeld, 1987; Cornes & Sandler, 
1986). 
 
Yet, the virtue of the Tiebout hypothesis is in its intuitive appeal. Being aware of the 
obvious existence problems and the strictness of the assumptions, the argumentation 
can in principle be regarded reasonable enough to describe the long-term market 
mechanism in allocating people efficiently in the spatial economy. Unfortunately, the 
Tiebout case is hard or even impossible to visualise graphically because of the added 
dimension of heterogeneity of people. The two-dimensional and pair-wise 
presentation does not suffice to depict city-dependent variability such that is not 
explained by city size equally for all people. At the simplest, the average welfare 
curves might be drawn to reach the same peak values for all cities in spite of their 
intrinsic heterogeneity. The main intuition still is that, at the long-term optimum, the 
experienced average welfares is equal in each heterogeneous city so that nobody has a 
motive to emigrate in seek for higher welfare. 
 
5 Conclusions 
The club theoretic model of the paper explains the welfare that a city can provide for 
its residents by city size. Proper utilization of agglomeration economies and 
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diseconomies determines a unique population optimum for each city. Migration based 
on welfare differentials incorporates the basic market mechanism into the spatial 
economy, but it cannot self evidently allocate people efficiently in geographic space. 
Locational choices differ from those in common commodity and factor markets in that 
people are not able to choose the preferred amounts or visitation rates. This 
elementary fact somewhat obscures the market mechanism in the spatial context. The 
local governments must act as supplementary market agents in choosing optimal 
population. This makes city size a continuous choice variable, and constitutes a close 
enough market analogy.   
 
The analysis shows that perfect mobility of people will alone yield efficiency only in 
the special case of homogenous people and big and homogenous cities. But even in 
this case, a Pareto superior outcome can be reached in the longer run if local 
governments restrict mobility so as to maximise personal net benefits of their 
residents. The long-run equilibrium necessitates that the number of cities increases so 
that optimal utilization of agglomeration economies is reachable in every city. 
Furthermore, in the case of small cities, migration will lead in corner solutions 
without local optimisation of population. A Pareto efficient optimum necessitates that 
the growing cities optimize on their population, and that the falling number of cities is 
an endogenous variable in the long-term evolution of the spatial economy. Total 
population can also be taken as a variable, but if total population is allowed to 
decrease the welfare implications are complicated unless a more global perspective is 
adopted.  
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The case of an economy consisting of asymmetric cities is both realistic and 
interesting. It says that if people are homogenous in that they see the welfare 
potentials in the cities equivalently and that systematic migration is based on truly 
experienced welfare differentials a stable and efficient market solution is not at all 
reachable. In this case even local optimization of population is not sufficient to sustain 
efficiency in the economy, and centralized intervention is necessary.  
 
The central government has two policy options, administrative regulation and lump 
sum transfers. The administrative measures, or quantity rationing, can be used to 
maintain the efficient allocation of people in spite of the existing welfare differentials 
between more prosperous and les prosperous cities. These kinds of measures may be 
difficult to implement in a free market economy because they necessitate constraints 
on mobility.  
 
Transfers between the cities yield a more promising policy measure. Lump sum 
transfers from richer to poorer cities aim to equalize the welfare differentials. The 
social welfare effects of these options are the same but, because of the welfare 
equalizing nature of the economic measure, the effects on individual welfares and on 
final allocation of people are different. In the transfer option people are allocated so 
that maximum individual welfare is reached everywhere, given the lump sum transfer. 
The optimal allocation corresponds to that yielded by the within-club rule of local 
policy-making, which is to say that less people live in the more prosperous cities than 
in the regulation option. 
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The findings about the effects of inter-city transfer policy are interesting because they 
not only say that the effects differ from those of the administrative policy alternatives 
but also reveal the fact that effective lump sum transfer policy necessitates 
endogenous determination of the number of cities. Therefore, lump sum transfers 
actually motor up reallocation of people between cities, which is a result that 
contradicts the conventional wisdom that inter-regional transfers should stabilize 
migration and inter-regional evolution in the economy. 
 
The final remark to the question about the working of the market mechanism in the 
spatial context is given by the famous Tiebout hypothesis. Assuming people explicitly 
heterogeneous from each other changes the picture profoundly. If people are allowed 
to see the connection of city size and welfare differently, and letting them to gather up 
according to these preferences, then a set of heterogeneous cities with homogeneous 
populations is formed. If all these cities optimize on their population and no integer 
problem exists, the outcome is a Pareto efficient long-term solution.  
 
The Tiebout hypothesis is abstract in nature and its practical usefulness is highly 
controversial, but it still receives serious attention. Its key point is that an efficient 
market equilibrium is feasible in the spatial context without any intervention by the 
central government. Of course it must also in this case be precluded that there are no 
inter-city externalities or other such issues such that would be of interest from the 
point of view of national-level welfare. 
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Figure 1: Migration between big homogenous cities 
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Figure 2: General equilibrium with optimization of city size 
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Figure 3: The case of small cities 
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Figure 4: General equilibrium of small cities 
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Figure 5: Heterogenous cities  
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Figure 6: Lump sum transfer from city A to city B  
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